Friday, December 31, 2004
Thursday, December 30, 2004
Wednesday, December 29, 2004
Monday, December 27, 2004
Under the context of the Family and Medical Leave Act, this issue is pertinent to the extent of a statute of limitation. The case in Carlton v. New York University School of Law can be found here.
Thursday, December 09, 2004
What is the correct interpretation of "chronic" disabilities under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (the "Act")?
At what point, in relation to the act of discrimination complained of, must a disability qualify as "chronic" to support recovery under the Act?
If the Act applies only to disabilities that are "chronic" at the timie of the alleged act of discrimination, is evidence of the progression of an illness or injury after the alleged act of discrimination probative of whether that disability was in fact "chronic" when the alleged act of discrimination occurred?
The case involved a worker who was laid off and claimed that he was the victim of discrimination under the Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The decision in Caruso v. Siemens Business Communication Systems, Inc. can be found here.
But her day of reckoning came. She was indicted, under 19 U.S.C. 228, which provides that a person who owes over $10,000 in child support obligations with respect to children who reside in another state. The primary issue at trial was whether Venturella "resided" in Florida. She claimed that the definition of "residence" should be the same as "domicile," which would require a showing that she intended to permanently live in Florida with no intent of returning to New York. The Government claimed that "residence" should be defined as her principal, actual dwelling place, which, it contended, was Florida.
The District Court adopted the Government's position over Venturella's objection. She was found guilty and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised release and a special assessment of $100 and ordered restitution of $59,073.06.
Venturella appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed. It held that to require an intent to remain as part of the definition of "resides" could lead to absurd results. It also noted that such a definition was at odds with the focus of the statute -- to offer federal criminal penalties against parents who willfully fail to honor their child support obligation and live in another state.
The Second Circuit rejected her position that the legislative history supported the position that residence within the meaning of the statute meant domicile. On the contrary, it held that the legislative history supported the Government's position.
The Court also rejected Venturella's arguments that the District Court's failure to hold the statute unconstitutionally vague and that the District Court's failure to instruct the jury on a dual residence defense were plain error. (Neither issue was raised before the District Court.) Finally, it dismissed the appeal as to her ineffectiveness of counsel claim in that its regular practice was not to hear such arguments on direct appeal.
The decision in United States v. Venturella can be found here.
Tuesday, December 07, 2004
In each of the cases, the plaintiffs had initiated actions for securites fradu prior to the passage of the Act. Then, after the Act was enacted, one plaintiff added additional claims and another added an additional defendant, trying to take advantage of the Act's extended statute of limitations.
The Court noted that normally statutes are not given retroactive effect. If the statute does not clearly provide that Congress intended it to be applied retroactively, then the statute will not be given retroactive effect if giving such retroactive effect would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.
The Court concluded that Congress did not clearly give the statute retroactive effect. Further, the Court held that reviving time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect by stripping defendants of an affirmative defense.
The decision can be found here.