In a case where Judge Calabresi concurs with himself (it's true; I couldn't make that up), the Second Circuit has held that the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which took away from the petitioner, who was being deported after serving a term of incarceration on a drug offense, the right to seek discretionary relief from the Attorney General, could not be applied retroactively in this case. The petitioner could have sought such relief at the time of his arrest, but chose to wait to a later time, expecting that he would have a stronger case after he had a record of rehabilitation after serving his sentence. Hence, his settled expectations were frustrated when the new legislation took away such rights. Since the Act did not clearly state that it was to be retroactive, the Court held that it could only be applied retroactively if it did not frustrate settled expectation. The Court noted that the district court, which had granted habeas relief to the petitioner on the ground that the Act could not be applied to criminal conduct that preceded the passage of the Act was wrong. It remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the petitioner could make an individualized showing that he had relied on his right to make an application for discretionary relief at a later time in waiving his right to do so at an earlier time. As noted, Judge Calabresi wrote the decision and issued a concurring opinion, in which the other panel members did not join, which provides "an explanation of the current state of the law in this complicated area, and how it relates to [this] case." The decision in Restrepo v. McElroy can be found here. Unfortunately, I cannot get a direct link to the concurring opinion, but it can be found at the Second Circuit site.