This is Sanford Hausler's blog about the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and its opinions. Nothing in this blog constitutes legal advice. But feel free to contact me at shausler at justice.com if you need help with an appeal either in the Second Circuit or in the New York appellate courts.
Monday, March 22, 2004
On March 3, 2004, the Second Circuit, in Fickling v. Flower, Medalie & Markowitz, Esqs. (In re Fickling), held that attorneys' fees earned prior to the conversion of a debtor's bankruptcy case from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 are dischargeable. The appellant in this case was a law firm that had represented the debtor in the Chapter 11 phase of the bankruptcy, but which withdrew prior to the conversion of the case to a Chapter 7. The Bankruptcy Court discharged the debtor from paying the attorneys' fees, and the District Court affirmed. Although the statutory language classified debts arising before the conversion as pre-petition debts, which are dischargeable, the law firm argued that (1) its fees were an administrative expense, and,hence not dischargeable, and (2) to treat the debt as dischargeable would ignore the implications of 11 U.S.C. 329, which gives the bankruptcy court the power to reveiw claims for attorneys fees. As to the first argument, the Second Circuit held that the statute gives an administrative claim a priority in payment, but has no effect on discharge. Absent a statutory exception, such claims may be discharged. As to the second argument, the Second Circuit noted that section 329 applied to post-petition attorney fee claims, which were not dischargeable. Hence, the statute was not superfluous. It just did not apply to this case. The law firm also sought to be paid on the basis of fraud by the debtor. It claims that it had not filed interim fee applications based on false assurances by the debtor that it would be paid out of the proceeds of a condemnation proceeding. The Court rejected this request because the law firm had not sought revocation of the discharge within a year, as required by the statute. (I'm having trouble getting a direct link to the case. You can find it at the Second Circuit site.)
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